THROWING STONES: 1 RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW

TRIUMPHS OVER HOMOPHOBIA
[A]s the trial of Amendment 2 has delineated, the underlying tension

between the community's desire to restrict those it despises and the
individual's desire to live freely and equally will remain a challenge,
as it has been since the time of this country's founding. Ultimately, it
is the hearts and minds of the public, not the courts, that hold the key
to a peaceful resolution. 2
INTRODUCTION

Evans,3

the United States Supreme Court held that bare
In Romer v.
segment of society cannot be a basis for gova
discrete
towards
animus
4
ernment discrimination. By doing so, the Court fueled speculation that
its equal protection jurisprudence contains a tier of constitutional scrutiny
that will be referred to in this Comment as "active" rational basis review. 5 In contrast to the extreme deference afforded government action
under traditional rational basis review, 6 active rational basis review entails very close scrutiny of whether the means chosen by the government
rationally further some legitimate state interest. Active rational basis review has the potential to protect groups whose rights have often been
trammeled upon by the state, but who do not meet the traditional criteria

1

See GRATEFUL DEAD, Throwing Stones, on IN THE DARK (Arista Records 1987); cf.

John 8:7 (New American) ("'Let the man among you who has no sin be the first to cast a
stone at her.'") (quoting Jesus).
2 Suzanne B. Goldberg, Gay Rights Through the Looking Glass: Politics, Morality
and the Trial of Colorado'sAmendment 2, 21 FORDHAm URB..L.J. 1057, 1081 (1994).

3 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).

4 See id. at 1627 (explaining that because Amendment Two was not rationally related
to the achievement of any of the state's asserted interests, it was "inexplicable by anythin§ but animus").
See Alfonso Madrid, Comment, Rational Basis Review Goes Back to the Dentist's

Chair: Can the Toothless Test of Heller v. Doe Keep Gays in the Military?, 4 TEMP.
POL. & Cirv. RTS. L. REv. 167, 175 (1994) (opining that the Ninth Circuit views City of
Cleburne v. CleburneLiving Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), as having created a level
of constitutional scrutiny known as active rational basis review).
6 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 ("The general rule is that legislation is presumed to
be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related
to a legitimate state interest.").
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necessary to qualify as a suspect class. 7 The use of active rational basis
review could have a mammoth effect upon many forms of government
action that are based upon a fear and loathing of lesbians and gay men. 8
Romer v. Evans was the first case in which the Supreme Court decided whether the Equal Protection Clause' applied to lesbian and gay
Americans. 10 Romer concerned an amendment to the Colorado Constitution known as Amendment Two, which prohibited any legislative, judicial, or executive civil rights protections for lesbians or gay men.
In
7 See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S.

144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
("[Pirejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities, and ... may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."). A suspect class is a group of individuals who have been classified according to a specific trait-the classification being possibly unconstitutional.
See
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) ("Mhe central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources
in the States. This strong policy renders racial classifications 'constitutionally suspect.'")
(quoting Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say
that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to
the most rigid scrutiny."); see also Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472-73 n.24 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (explaining the imprecision with
which suspect classes are analyzed).
8 For the remainder of this Comment, lesbians, gay men, bisexuals,
and transgendered persons will be referred to as "lesbians and gay men." See Richard E. Cytowic,
All in the Genes, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1996, (Book World), at 9 (proposing that the use
of "gays and lesbians" implies recognition that lesbians and gay men are not simply female and male varieties of the same thing). This may be underinclusive and not fully representative of the varied nuances of human sexuality and apologies are made in advance
to anyone who may take issue with these generalizations. See, e.g., Stephen H. Miller,
Editorials/Letters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1996, at AlS (noting that the interests of gays
and lesbians are distinct from those of other groups differing sexually from mainstream
society); Christopher Ott, Editorials/Letters, N.Y. TMES, Sept. 11, 1996, at A18
(decrying the equation of the interests of gay and transgendered persons). In addition, the
term "homosexual" will not be used because it and "heterosexual" were invented by
nineteenth century, male scientists in order to establish heterosexuality as "the assumed,
different-sex erotic ideal we know today." JONATHAN NED KATZ, THE INVENTION Op
HETEmOSEXUALITY 12, 18 (1995).
9 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause provides
that
"[nlo State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." Id.
10 See Ben-Shalom v. Stone, 494 U.S. 1004, 1004 (1990). The Court, by denying
certiorari in this case, declined its first opportunity to rule on the rights of lesbians and
gay men under the Equal Protection Clause. See id. Ben-Shalom involved a U.S. Army
Reserve sergeant who was denied reenlistment solely because she was a lesbian See BenShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 456 (7th Cir. 1989).
it See COLD. CONST. art. II, § 30b, held unconstitutional in Romer v. Evans, 116 S.
Ct. 1620 (1996) (commonly known as Amendment Two). Amendment Two read as follows:
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2
1986, the Court heard its first "gay rights" case, Bowers v. Hardwick,1
but there the Court applied the Due Process Clause 13 to a criminal sodomy statute. Before Romer, courts deciding equal protection challenges
to sexual orientation discrimination were unsure of how the Bowers decision, based upon a reading of the Due Process Clause, impacted upon an
equal protection analysis.
These courts often became entangled in a
thicket of due process analysis when the case before the court was, instead, an equal protection challenge.' 5 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Romer, certain commentators and litigators hoped the Court
would declare that lesbians and gay men constitute a suspect class 16 or

Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments,
nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct,
practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of, or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
Id.
Amendment Two was potentially dangerous because it became a benchmark upon
which other ballot initiatives were modeled. See Lori J. Rankin, Comment, Ballot Initiatives and Gay Rights: Equal Protection Challenges to the Right's Canpaign Against
Lesbians and Gay Men, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1055, 1056-57 n.5 (1994) (asserting that the
text of proposed ballot initiatives in Oregon and Cincinnati, Ohio, generally mirrored the
wording of Amendment Two).
12 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Bowers, the plaintiff challenged Georgia's sodomy statute. See id. at 187-88. Bowers held that same-sex sodomy was not a fundamental right
for the purposes of substantive due process. See id. at 192. Bowers found that sodomy
alone was not a right without which "'neither liberty nor justice would exist,'" which is
one of several criteria used to determine whether a right is protected by substantive due
process. See id. at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937)).
Sodomy was also found not to have been "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition.'" See id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977) (footnote omitted)).
13 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause provides that "[n]o
State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." Id.; see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194 (stating that the Court was reluctant to recognize new fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause).
14 See Rankin, supra note 11, at 1066-69 (describing the difficulty that courts have
had in deciding equal protection cases involving the government); see also Ben-Shalom,
881 F.2d at 464; High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d
563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
15 See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571 (reasoning that even though Bowers involved
a substantive due process analysis, it nonetheless impacted the equal protection challenge
to sexual orientation discrimination); Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464 (same); see also Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that if the government can
cniminalize same-sex conduct, "a group that is defined by reference to that conduct cannot constitute a 'suspect class'").
16 See Renee Culverhouse & Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect Class, 34
S. TEX. L. REV. 205, 249 (1993); see also Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699,
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that there is a fundamental right to participate in, and not be fenced out
of, the political process. 17 If the plaintiffs in Romer could have proven
the existence of a suspect class or a fundamental right, Amendment Two
would have received strict scrutiny. 1 8
In deciding Romer, however the Court did not apply any form of
heightened constitutional review.16 Instead, Amendment Two failed rational basis scrutiny. 20 As such, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court,
did not address the issue of whether there is a fundamental right to participate in the political
process or whether lesbians and gay men qualify
21
as a suspect class.
First, the Romer Court should have admitted that its analysis was
22
very different from traditionally passive forms of rational basis review.
The Court should have provided clarification to lower courts because
judges were in urgent need of a framework with which to analyze chal724-28 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring) (arguing that lesbians and gay men meet
most criteria of a suspect class).
17 See Brief for Amici Curiae Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Japanese American Citizens League, National Council of La Raza, and Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund in Support of Respondents at 7, Romer v. Evans, 116 S.
Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 94-1039); Brief of The Colorado Bar Association, Other State and
Local Bar Associations and Various National Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents at 6, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 94-1039); Brief for
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., The Mexican American Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, and Women's Legal Defense Fund as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 4, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 94-1039).
See generally Stephanie L. Grauerholz, Comment, Colorado's Amendment 2 Defeated:
The Emergence of a Fundamental Right to Participate in the Political Process, 44
DEPAUL L. REv. 841 (1995) (providing an overview of the various arguments against
Amendment Two, including the fundamental right to participate in the political process).
18 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). To
pass strict scrutiny, government action must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government objective. See id. Strict scrutiny often requires that alternative means be
explored before choosing to discriminate based upon a certain classification. See United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 200 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that it is
unwise to apply strict scrutiny without examining whether alternatives were explored before choosing the challenged classification).
19 See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996). For a discussion of heightened scrutiny, see Martin A. Schwartz, Equal ProtectionDevelopments, N.Y. LJ., Sept.
17, 1996, at 3, 7 (noting that under intermediate scrutiny, a government classification
must be substantially related to an important state interest). Thus far, women have been
the most notable class protected by this form of heightened scrutiny. See id.
20 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629. If a classification burdens neither
a suspect class
of citizens nor a fundamental constitutional right, rational basis review requires "that the
classification bear a rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative
end." Id. at 1627.
21 See id. at 1624; see also Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612,
618
(1985) ("[lI]f the statutory scheme cannot pass even the minimum rationality test, our inquig ends.-).
See ifra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
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lenges to sexual orientation discrimination. 23 Finally, the majority could
have defended itself from the judicial criticism and litany of invectives
hurled by Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion. 2 4 In doing so, the Justices
could have clarified for lower courts the distinctions between substantive
due process and equal protection analyses. 25
Part I of this Comment will survey the majority and dissenting
opinions in Romer v. Evans. Part II of the Comment attempts to examine
the similar active rational basis review anases employed in United
States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, City of Cleburne v. Cle-

23 See Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1283, 1284 (2d Cir. 1996) (various lesbians and gay men serving in the U.S. military and U.S. Coast Guard challenged government's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (naval midshipman was "separated" from the U.S. Naval Academy because, as a
gay man, he possessed "'insufficient aptitude for commissioned service'"); Meinhold v.
United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994) (U.S. Navy discharged Petty Officer Volker Keith Meinhold after he came out on ABC's World News
Tonight by stating "Yes, I am in fact gay"); Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1161 (9th
Cir. 1992) (U.S. Army Reserve Captain Dusty Pritt was dismissed after giving an interview to the Los Angeles Th-nes in which she discussed the difficulties of balancing her
faith, her sexual orientation, and her promotion to Major); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881
F.2d 454, 456 (7th Cir. 1989) (U.S. Army Reserve sergeant was denied reenlistment
solely because she was a lesbian); Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 702
(9th Cir. 1989) (soldier who admitted to having had sex with a man sometime before
1968 was discharged from the Army in 1981 despite a report by his commanding officer
that the soldier had an "'outstanding professional attitude,'" "'no problems what-so-ever
[sic] dealing with other assigned members,'" and "'become one of our most respected
and trusted soldiers, both by his superiors and his subordinates'"); Cammermeyer v.
Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 912 (W.D. Wash. 1994), appeal dismissed and remanded, 97
F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996) (Washington State National Guard colonel discharged for being
a lesbian despite having been decorated with the Bronze Star for exemplary service in
Vietnam); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured ConstitutionalSteps, 71 IND. LJ. 297, 351
(1996) (arguing that, in the context of military sexual orientation discrimination, courts
may not need to take incremental constitutional steps). See generally David M. Bessho,
Note, The Military Ban on Homosexuals: Suspect, Constitutional, or Both?, 12 GA. ST.
U. L. REv. 845 (1996) (concluding that lesbian and gay service members' equal protection challenges cannot overcome the deference afforded military policies).
For a detailed discussion of Steffin, see Victoria P. Coombs, Note, Status Versus
Conduct: ConstitutionalJurisprudence Meets Prejudice in Steffan v. Perry, 1995 UTAH
L. REV. 593, 595-614 (1995). For an in-depth examination of the military ban on lesbians and gay men, see generally Alan N. Yount, Comment, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: The
Same Old Policy in a New Uniform?, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 215 (1995)
(discussing the inconsistent decisions among the circuit courts concerning the "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy).
See, e.g., Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the
Court's equal protection jurisprudence as having reached "terminal silliness"); id. at
1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing as "preposterous" the idea that lesbians and gay
men are politically powerless).
25 See infra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
26 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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burne Living Center, Inc. ,27 and Romer v. Evans.2 Finally, Part III will
probe the shortcomings, deficiencies, and analytical errors in the Romer
majority and dissenting opinions. Specifically, this part will expose why
the dissent's reliance on the substantive due process considerations of
Bowers was misplaced. Additionally, this part asserts that, in contrast to
the dissent's characterization, Amendment Two Was decidedly undemocratic and the result of a well-orchestrated public relations campaign.
This Comment concludes by determining that the Court should have
written a decision more useful to gay rights litigators by recognizing the
existence of an unconventional level of rational basis scrutiny. In any
event, Romer will be valuable in tearing down an entire societal structure
that assigns "separate but equal" 2 9 status to lesbians and gay men.
I.

AMENDMENT TWO: IRRATIONAL OR KULTURKAMPF?. 3

In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court of the United States considered the validity of an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that proscribed an executive, legislative, or judicial protection for lesbians and
gay men. 3 7 Nine days after Amendment Two passed by popular referendum, 32 Richard G. Evans, eight other individuals,3 3 and various local
government entities sued to enjoin enforcement of the amendment. 34 The
plaintiffs claimed that the enforcement of Amendment Two unconstitutionally placed lesbians and gay men in jeopardy of discrimination for
which there would be no recourse. 35 Meanwhile, Governor Roy Romer
27 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
n 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
29 C. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954) (explaining that
"separate
but equal" is a system that offers equal treatment to the races by supplying each with
substantially similar, but separate, facilities).
30 See WEBSTER'S ThD NEW INTERNIONAL DICTIONARY 1257
(1993). Kultur-

kampf is defined as a "conflict between civil government and religious authorities
esplecially] over control of education and church appointments." Id.
See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, held unconstitstional in Romer v. Evans, 116
S.
Ct. 1620 (1996).
32 See Evans v. Romer, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,719,
at 77,932 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. Dec. 14, 1993), aft'd, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), affid sub nom. Romer v. Evans,
116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (stating that Amendment Two was approved by 53.4% of Coloradans who voted in the 1992 election).
33 See Grauerholz, supra note 17, at 845 n.31 (relating that Martina Navrafilova,
a
lesbian and one of the most famous professional tennis players of all time, was a plaintiff
in the lawsuit).
See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993) (describing the injunction
issued by the state district court).
35 See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1624 (1996) (detailing
how the plaintiffs,
many of whom were lesbians, gay men, and/or government employees whose jobs were
at risk due to Amendment Two, commenced litigation to enjoin its enforcement).
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of Colorado defended the amendment and asserted that it would do
36 no
more than prevent lesbians and gay men from reaping special rights.
The trial court granted an injunction against enforcement of the

amendment.37 The Colorado Supreme Court sustained the injunction and
remanded the case for further review. 38 Relying on the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court of Colorado
held that Amendment Two should be subjected to strict scrutiny because
it encroached on the fundamental right of lesbians and gay men to participate in the political system. 39 Governor Romer, challenging the Colorado Supreme Court's imposition of strict scrutinj, filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari, which the Court later denied.
On remand, the state
trial court determined whether any proffered justifications for Amendment Two were narrowly tailored to further a compelling government
interest but none were found to be satisfactory. 41 The Supreme Court of

3

See id.
See Evans v. Romer, 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,998, at 73,841 (Colo.
Dist.
Ct. Jan. 15, 1993), aff'd, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Romer v.
Evans, 510 U.S. 959 (1993); id. at 73,834-35 (setting forth the threshold question and six
other factors that a trial court must examine in determining whether it should issue a pre-

liminary injunction).

39 See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1286 (affirming the preliminary injunction and remanding
for a trial to determine whether Amendment Two could withstand strict judicial scrutiny).
39 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624 (citing Evans, 854 P.2d at 1286). Relying
on
United States Supreme Court voting rights cases and cases involving the structure of government decision making and the political process, the state supreme court held that
Amendment Two should be subjected to strict scrutiny. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1275-84
(citing Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467-70 (1982); Gordon v.
Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 5 (1971); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969); Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30, 31 (1968); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 377 (1967);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89, 94 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)).
The right to vote and the right to have one's vote count equally are fundamental
rights that cannot be contingent on a citizen's race. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554,
555 (declaring that "dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote" is as constitutionally repugnant as an outright prohibition on voting). Additionally, government decision-making
cannot take into account one's race. See, e.g., Reitman, 387 U.S. at 380-81 (holding that
a state may not authorize racial discrimination in housing markets). Any state action that
classifies individuals along these racial lines is, therefore, subjected to strict scrutiny and
must be designed to achieve a compelling government interest. See, e.g., Wdliams, 393
U.S. at 31 (concluding that the state did not show a compelling interest justifying "such
heay burdens on the right to vote and to associate").
See Romer v. Evans, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
41 See Evans v. Romer, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,719, at 77,938 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. Dec. 14, 1993), aff'd, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Romer v. Evans,
116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). Accordingly, the court entered a permanent injunction against
Amendment Two. See id. at 77,940.
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Colorado affirmed that ruling42 and the United States Supreme Court
granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. 43
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, which was4
joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. "
The Court opened its opinion by invoking Justice Harlan's dissent from
Plessy v. Ferguson,4 stating that the Constitution cannot tolerate egregious deviations from America's egalitarian ideals.
The majority commenced its analysis by providing an overview of the structure of modem
civil rights statutes and how they affect interaction between private citizens. 47 Generally, Justice Kennedy explained, these civil rights laws
identify persons who are charged with a duty of not discriminating and
enumerate those within the law's scope of protection." Justice Kennedy
concluded that after Amendment Two, every Colorado civil rights law
that specified sexual orientation as a basis for protected status would have
been unavailable as shelter from private discrimination against lesbians

and gay men.4
The Court then probed exactly how Amendment Two would change
the way in which lesbian and gay Coloradans interacted with their state
government. 50 Justice Kennedy pointed out that, first, the amendment
would have abolished laws and executive orders designed to protect lesbians and gay men. 51 The majority noted that the state supreme court
had previously found that prohibitions on discrimination in state em42 See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1350 (Colo. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Romer v.
Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
43 See Romer v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995). The Supreme Court of the United
States is the ultimate arbiter of cases involving a federal constitutional challenge to a
state's actions. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 WheaL) 304, 336-37, 337-38
(1816). Therefore, because the Colorado Supreme Court issued a final decision after reviewing Amendment Two, the United States Supreme Court had certiorari jurisdiction to
review the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1988) (current version of § 25 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, which was the linchpin of Martin).
44 See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623
(1996).
45 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
46 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623 (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559
(Harlan, J., dis-

senting)).

47 See id. at 1625 (citing IOWA CODE §§ 216.6 to .8 (1994); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §
363.03 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7, -A:10, -A:17
(1995); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-3, -4 (West Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§
1302, 1402 (West 1987); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 953, 955 (West Supp. 1996);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 20-13-10, -22, -23 (Michie 1995)).
48 See id. (focusing on places of public accommodation, such as "hotels, restaurants,
hospitals, dental clinics, theaters, banks, common carriers, travel and insurance agencies,
and 'shops and stores dealing with goods and services of any kind'" (citation omitted)).
49 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626.
5D See id.
51 See id.
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53
ployment 52 and on state college campuses would have been repealed.
As such, the Court found that Amendment Two would have constrained
the state government in more than just its official actions, but would also
impact
Colorado's less formal poliides 5 concerning lesbians and gay
55

men.

Second, the Court viewed it to have been a permissible, if not required, conclusion that Amendment Two would have forbidden generally
56
In the next
applicable laws from applying to lesbians and gay men.
breath, however, Justice Kennedy observed that it was unnecessary to
57
determine whether the amendment, in fact, would have had that effect.
The majority held that, notwithstanding footnote nines of the Colorado
52

See id. (discussing the Colorado gubernatorial order that prohibits discrimination

based on sexual orientation in state government hiring and employment).
S3 See id. (citing Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1285 (Colo. 1993)). The Evans
case discussed the prohibitions against sexual orientation discrimination at Metropolitan
State College of Denver and Colorado State University. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1285
n.26.
54 See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 1078 (recounting the testimony of the State's witness at the trial of Amendment Two). Pat Romero, Personnel Director of the Colorado
Department of Education, conducted sensitivity training sessions to assist state employees
in challenging sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace. See id. Much to the
chagrin of the state attorney who was attempting to show Amendment Two to be prohibitive only of "special rights," Romero stated that because of Amendment Two, her superior had instructed her to cease conducting these training sessions. See id.
5 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626.

56 See id. (citing CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104(1)(f) (West Supp. 1996); id. §
18-8-405 (West 1990); id. § 24-4-106(7)). Justice Kennedy explained that once a government actor debated whether same-sex orientation is an arbitrary basis for disparate
treatment, she would have violated the mandate of Amendment Two. See id.; see also
Transcript of Oral Argument, at 6, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 941039) (discussing whether Amendment Two prohibits only special rights or whether it
also relates to policies of state government regarding lesbians and gay men). Much of the
discussion at oral argument before the United States Supreme Court centered on whether
generally applicable laws would continue to apply to lesbians and gay men. See id. One
of the Justices posed the following hypothetical scenario to Colorado Deputy Solicitor
Timothy M. Tymkovich: "I mean, the literal language would indicate that, for example,
[under Amendment Two], a public library could refuse to allow books to be borrowed by
homosexuals and there would be no relief from that, apparently." See id.; see also id. at
17-20, 25-30, 32-39 (discussing further the interplay between special rights, arbitrary discrimination, and laws of general applicability); Goldberg, supra note 2, at 1078
(recounting the testimony of the State's witness at the trial of Amendment Two concerning the permissibility of sensitivity training sessions).
57 See Romer, 116S. Ct. at 1626.
58 See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1346 n.9 (Colo. 1994), aff'd sub nom.
Romer
v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). Footnote nine read:
In this regard, it is significant to note that Colorado law currently proscribes discrimination against persons who are not suspect classes, including discrimination based on age... ; marital or family status... ; veterans' status ... ; and for any legal, off-duty conduct such as smoking
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Supreme Court opinion, the Court must reject the State's assertion that
Amendment Two rescinded only special rights for lesbians and gay
men. 59 Assuming, arguendo, that the amendment only prohibited special
rights for lesbians and gay men, the Justice reasoned that these citizens
are still strapped with the burden of amending their state constitution in
Thus, Justice Kenorder to pass legislation germane to their interests.
nedy pointed out, lesbians and gay men are singled out for more burdensome political treatment; treatment to which members of other protected
classes are not subjected. 61 Justice Kennedy concluded that civil rights
protections for lesbians and gay men are not special rights. 62 The Justice
asserted, instead, that heterosexuals either do not need civil 63rights protections or are already protected from arbitrary discrimination.

Of course Amendment 2 is not intended to have any effect
tobacco ....
on this legislation, but seeks only to prevent the adoption of antidiscrimination laws intended to protect gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.
Id. (citations omitted). The petitioners in Romer relied upon the Colorado Supreme
Court's insertion of footnote nine as evidence that Amendment Two would have only
prohibited special rights. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 56, at 6.
59 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626-27. "No special rights" was a popular rallying cry
employed by Colorado for Family Values (CFV), the political and financial sponsor of
Amendment Two. See Marc L. Rubinstein, Note, Gay Rights and Relgion: A Doctrinal
Approach to the Argument that Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives Wolate the Fstablishment
Clause, 46 HAsTNoS L.J. 1585, 1607 (1995). Additionally, "No Special Rights" did not
appear in the text of the amendment, but CFV chose to use the phrase in its promotional
materials with the hope that Coloradans would therefore support the ballot initiative. See
Goldberg, supra note 2, at 1071.
60 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627. In short, Amendment Two sliced lesbians and gay
men out of the civil rights protection pie. See id.; see also Craig Cassin Burke, Note,
Fencing Out Politically Unpopular Groups from the Normal Political Processes: The
Equal Protection Concerns of Colorado Amendment 7w, 69 IND. L.J. 275, 276 (1993)
(noting that, in order to pass legislation protecting their civil rights, Amendment Two
forced lesbians and gay men to, first, repeal the amendment by statewide referendum and,
second, to lobby the legislature to protect them; thus, Amendment Two violated equal
protection); John F. Niblock, Comment, Anti-Gay Initiatives: A Callfor Heightened Judicial Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REV. 153, 174 (1993) (explaining that Amendment Two
made it impossible for a group of citizens to lobby a representative body to enact legislation supporting lesbian and gay interests).
61 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627. Yet, it remains possible, without violating equal
protection, for the legislature to repeal civil rights protections in some circumstances.
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 56, at 45 (conceding that the citizens of
Colorado could repeal ordinances protecting lesbians and gay men through the use of ordinary legislation). Jean Dubofsky, counsel for Respondents, asserted, however, that any
amendment or piece of legislation precluding all future political debate concerning lesbians and gay men would violate the fundamental right to participate in the political process. See id.
See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
63 See id.
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The Court at last determined that Amendment Two should be subjected to rational basis review.6 To pass rational basis scrutiny, Justice
Kennedy explained, the challenged government action must be rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.
Having already analyzed the potential workings of the amendment, the majority found that Amendment
Two was not rationally related to achieving the State's asserted goals. 6 6
Justice Kennedy determined that Amendment Two imposed serious disabilities on a distinct group of citizens. 67 As such, the Court concluded,
the rationale for the amendment could have been only animosity towards
lesbians and gay men." The Court held that animus cannot be a valid
predicate to state discrimination.6

See id. (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993)). In equal protection
cases, rational basis review is the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny to which the
Court will subject government action. See Deborah L. Brake, Sex as a Suspect Class:
An Argument for Applying Strict Scrutiny to Gender Discrimintion, 6 SETON HALL
CONST. LJ. 953, 953 (1996). To pass rational basis review, the challenged state action
must have a legitimate purpose, and the means chosen must be rationally related to
achieving that legitimate government end. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ("Tne general rule is that legislation is presumed to be
valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to
a legitimate state interest." (citation omitted)). Government action will be invalidated under rational basis review if it is based solely on irrational prejudice toward, or unreasonable fear of, a particular group. See id. at 448-50; see als insfra notes 107-78 and accomTying text.
See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627. Rational basis review requires that the classification created by the government "bear a rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end." Id.
See id.; Goldberg, supra note 2, at 1063 (describing the six justifications advanced
by Colorado in support of Amendment Two); see also Grauerholz, supra note 17, at 848
(describing CFV's campaign materials supporting Amendment Two). CFV's campaign
materials stated that the purposes of Amendment Two were "protecting 'traditional family
values and structures,' safeguarding children from sexual molestation, protecting
'individuals' rights to view homosexuality as immoral,' preventing dissolution of civil
rights protection for 'authentic minorities,' diminishing the cost for treatment of AIDS and
its 'deadly consequences,' and furthering the view that homosexuality is curable." Id.
(citation omitted).
67 See Romer, 116S. Ct. at 1627.
69 See id. at 1628; see also United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528,
534 (1973) ("[A] bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute
a legitimate governmental interest.-). Moreno involved an equal protection challenge to
the 1971 amendments to the Food Stamp Act of 1964, which proscribed food stamp
benefits for any household consisting of more than a nuclear family. See id. at 529. The
Court found the regulation to have been targeted at "hippies" and other undesirables of
the 1960s to whom Congress did not want to extend social service benefits. See id. at
534.
69 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628-29. Because all legislation classifies
one group or
another for disparate treatment, government discrimination may, at times, not run afoul of
constitutional strictures. See id. at 1627.
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When the Court probed the rationale for Amendment Two, it reviewed only one of the six justifications offered for its enactment. 70 In
evaluating the State's claim that it was protecting its citizens' First
Amendment freedoms,71 Justice Kennedy observed that the way Amendment Two would function did not comport rationally with that justification for the amendment. 72 Because the nexus between the means chosen
and the desired end was so attenuated, the Court held that it could not
plausibly credit that justification for the amendment. 73 The Justice held
that Colorado could not classify lesbians and gay men for the very purAs
pose of making them unequal to the rest of the state's citizens.
such, the Court held Amendment Two unconstitutional. 75
Justice Scalia authored the dissenting6 opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined. The dissenting Justice com77
menced by arguing that Amendment Two prohibited only special rights.
To bolster this assertion, the Justice cited footnote nine of the Colorado

70 See id. at 1629. The stated purposes behind Amendment Two were to: (1) deter
factionalism; (2) preserve the virtues of the political process; (3) preserve Colorado's
ability to address adequately discrimination against other minority groups; (4) prevent
Colorado from endorsing a political ideology; (5) prohibit interference with citizens' associational rights; and (6) protect children. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 1063.
71 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The fuil text of the First Amendment reads:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
Id.
72 See Romer, 116S. Ct. at 1629.
73 See id.
74 See id. (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883) (stating that "class
legislation... [is) obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment")). See
generally Melanie E. Meyers, Note, Impermissible Purposes and the Equal Protection
Clause, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1184 (1986) (proposing new analytical framework that would
void a government classification if it is born of an impermissible purpose); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 56, at 20-25 (probing whether Amendment Two was
rational). One of the Justices repeatedly asked Mr. Tymkovich to explain the rational
basis behind Amendment Two. See id. at 20. Nine questions were required from the
Court before Mr. Tymkovich articulated a reason for the amendment other than that, in
effect, Amendment Two was a popular reaction to various political successes of lesbians
and pay men. See id. at 24.
See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
76 See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77 See id. at 1630 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (reasoning that because the Colorado Supreme Court opinion found generally applicable laws to be unaffected by Amendment
Two, the protections repealed by Amendment Two were special rights, unavailable to the

rest of the community).
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Supreme Court opinion. 78 In defending the Colorado voters who adopted
Amendment Two, 79 Justice Scalia argued that the amendment was not an
irrational, vengeful "fit of spite," but was, instead, a means by which
Coloradans could enter the debate, or Kulturkampf,8 0 regarding civil
rights for lesbians and gay men.8 1
The dissent gave no credence to the majority's assertion that, under
Amendment Two, "assaults upon homosexuals could not be prosecuted. " 8 Justice Scalia believed that this parade of horribles would not
come to fruition because the dissent viewed Amendment Two as prohibiting only special rights, and having no effect upon laws of general application. 3 The opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia alleged, supports the
proposition that a group is denied equal treatment when, to obtain special
rights or avoid discrimination, it must petition a higher and more general
level of legislators to obtain the same privileges that others may seek at
the local level 8 4 By analogy, Justice Scalia analyzed a hypothetical state
law prohibiting mayors or city council members from awarding municipal
contracts to their relatives. 85 The dissenting Justice claimed that the majority's reasoning might render this a denial of equal protection because,
to be awarded municipal contracts, the relatives of these politicians would
need to petition the state legislature for redress while all other citizens
would need only to influence their local municipal officers.86 Justice
Scalia claimed that it would be ridiculous to characterize this hypothetical
law as violative of equal protection and opined that the majority would
have found such a law to be rational.8 7 Justice Scalia reasoned that,
likewise, there was no doubt concerning the rational basis for Amendment Two."'

79 See id. (quoting Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1346 n.9 (1994), af'd sub
nom.

Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)). For the text of the Colorado Supreme Court's
footnote number nine, see supra note 58.
79 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (describing the supporters
of
Amendment Two as "tolerant Coloradans").
so See supra note 30.

See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The amendment prohibits special treatment of
homosexuals, and nothing more.").
81

83 See id.

94 See id. ("Mhe principle underlying the Court's opinion is that one who is accorded equal treatment under the laws, but cannot as readily as others obtain preferential
treatment under the laws, has been denied equal protection of the laws.").
85 See id. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87 See id.
88 See id.
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In exploring how Amendment Two satisfied the rational basis test,
Justice Scalia relied heavily upon Bowers v. Hardwick a 1986 case that
was analyzed in a substantive due process framework.8 Building upon a
theme pursued at Romer's oral argument, 90 Justice Scalia contended that
if it is not unconstitutional to criminalize same-sex sodomy, then it is perfectly logical to discourage that practice through ballot measures such as
Amendment Two. 9 1 The Justice stated that, even if there exist lesbians
or gay men who do not engage in same-sex sodomy, equal protection is
not violated
simply because a law could have been drawn with more pre92
cision.
Thereafter, Justice Scalia argued that because lesbians and gay men
have been disapproved of by society for time immemorial, Amendment
Two was entirely reasonable. 93 By stating that lesbians and gay men
have had a few local successes with gay rights legislation, Justice Scalia
attempted to classify lesbians and gay men as oligarchic political players. 94 From all this, Justice Scalia painted lesbians and gay men simply
as losers in a societal debate. 95 The Justice maintained that resolving the
debate on a statewide level consisting of but one question was most
democratic. 9 Finally, the dissenting Justice asserted, the Court's declaration that government must "remain open on impartial terms to all who
seek its assistance" is proven false every time a law is passed that disfavors a certain type of objectionable conduct. 97 As an example, the dissent cited Davis v. Beason, which held that it is not unconstitutional to
99 See id. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).

For additional discus-

sion of Bowers, see supra note 12.
90 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 56, at 8-9.
91 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92 See id. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 485 (1970)); see aLso New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592
(1979) (applying the rule of Massachusetts Boardof Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
314 (1976), that "[pierfection in making the necessary classifications is neither possible
nor necessary"). The plaintiffs in these cases unsuccessfully argued that the classifications were invalid because the government's generalizations were imperfect and could
result in individual cases of unequal treatment. See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 592; Murgia,
427 U.S. at 315-16; Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 486.
93 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94 See id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95 See id. Justice Scalia claimed not to be critical of the gay rights movement. See
id. The Justice stated, however, that gay rights supporters must take the bitter with the
sweet regarding the legislative process, that has at times been successful for the gay rights
movement. See id.

96 See id. But see Burke, supra note 60, at 276; Niblock, supra note 60, at 174.

97 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that,
likewise, the majority's pronouncement was wrong because theocrats or monarchists are not
deprived of equal protection of the laws even though they cannot establish, respectively, a
government religion or a queen. See id. at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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deny bigamists and polygamists the right to vote. 9s The Justice rhetorically questioned whether Romer, by analogy, now voids the prohibitions
against polygamy contained in the state constitutions of Arizona, Idaho,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah. 99
In sum, Justice Scalia concluded that the Court should not be in the

business of choosing sides in the "culture war." 1o The dissenting Justice opined that lesbians and gay men simply lost a local debate in which
the Court should play no role.101 Because the membership of the United

States Supreme Court consists of lawyers, the Justice insisted, its opinion
usually differs from that of most Americans concerning what is socially
acceptable. 12 As such, Justice Scalia expressed his desire for a more
plebeian approach to constitutional law by highlighting that Congress has

not included lesbians or gay men under federal civil rights legislation.1°3

It follows, the Justice implied, that Amendment Two was entirely consistent with democratic ideals. 104 Justice Scalia ended by claiming that the
Court's rejection of Amendment Two lacked any foundation in constitutional law and was an act of political will. 105

9 See id. (citing Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 348 (1890)).

In Davis, the defendant violated a territorial law by registering to vote in an election. See Davis, 133 U.S. at
334-35. To vote, a registrant had to swear, inter alia, that he had never practiced bigamy
or polygamy. See id.at 334. The defendant had, in fact, been a practicing Mormon and
a bigamist or polygamist. See id. at 334-35. The Court held that denying bigamists and
poloamists the right to vote was not unconstitutional. See id. at 348.
See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100 See id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). While declining officially to endorse heterosexual marriage, Justice Scalia quoted Murphy v. Ramsey for the proposition that heterosexual marriage is a "holy estate.. .; the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civilization." Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1636-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885)).
101 See id. at 1634, 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102 See id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103 See id. (citing Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, S.2238, 103d Cong.
(1994); Civil Rights Amendments of 1975, H.R. 5452, 94th Cong. (1975); 42 U.S.C. §
12211(a) (1988 ed., Supp. V) (stating that lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals do not qualify
for disabled status under the Americans with Disabilities Act)).
Oh September 10, 1996, the Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 1996, S. 2056,
104th Cong. (1996), failed to pass the United States Senate by one vote. See 142 CONG.
REc. S10,138-39 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (roll call vote tally). The bill prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by employers with fifteen or
more employees, but did not apply to the provision of employee benefits for the benefit of
an employee's partner. See <http://thomas.loc.gov> (visited Mar. 23, 1997). The bill
also exempted religious organizations and the armed forces. See id.
104 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105 See id.
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BITHER MINIMAL NOR STRICT, BUT STRANGE UNTO ITsELF"1 O6

Romer v. Evans did nothing to Iuell ongoing criticism of the
Court's equal protection jurisprudence. 10 After numerous cases involv1
ing rational basis review, the Court has been accused of "tinkering"
with the legislative process and chided for its "rudderless" 1" and incoherent ° application of equal protection principles. After Romer, these
criticisms have become moot because Romer confirms that the Court is
comfortable applying an additional level of e~ual protection review.
Whether one calls it "rational basis with teeth,"
"'active' rational basis review," 1 12 or "second-order" rational basis review,1 1 3 Romer
epitomizes this unconventional level of constitutional scrutiny.
A.

A Compact History of Equal ProtectionScrutiny

To understand where Romer and this unorthodox level of review
fits, a brief examination of Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence is in
order. Conventionally, rational basis review requires simply that a legislative enactment have some rational relation to a legitimate state interest. 114 Thus, in llliamson v. Lee Optical, Inc.,"' the Court upheld an
Oklahoma statute that prohibited opticians "from fitting or duplicating
lenses without a prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist."'
106 Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 31 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107

See generally Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Break-

down of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OEO ST. LJ. 161, 165-72 (1984) (asserting that courts
have abandoned traditional tests in examining equal protection claims).
109 See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(opining that, outside of discrimination based on race or national origin, the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence can be characterized as "endless tinkering").
109 See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 321 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (determining the Court's equal protection methods to be
.rudderless, affording no notice to interested parties").
110 See Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 3 (1976) ("Surely we are
near the point of maximum incoherence of equal protection doctrine.").
ill David 0. Stewart, A Growing Equal Protection Clause?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1985,
at
108, 112 (quoting Professor Victor Rosenblum of Northwestern University Law School).
Traditionally, legislation is rarely invalidated if it receives rational basis scrutiny. See id.
112 Madrid, supra note 5, at 175.
113 Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: CongressionalFindings, Constitutional
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 695, 728 (1996)
(characterizing the constitutional scrutiny applied in Cleburne as second-order rational
basis review).
114 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
("T he general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.").
115 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
116 Id. at 486.
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The majority hypothesized that the Oklahoma Legislature might have decided that any change in eye wear should be accompanied by a prescription from an eye care expert. 117 The Court further speculated that the
legislature might have concluded that in order to regulate eyeglass lenses
effectively, it needed to regulate the entire field of eyeglass frames. 1is In
sum, the Justices declared that it was for the legislature, not the judiciary, to address societal problems in a rational fashion.1 19 The Court gave
the state statute virtuallyono scrutiny and deferred, instead, to the judgment of the legislature.
Lee Optical is a classic example of traditional
rational basis scrutiny.12 1 Once it is determined that mere rational basis
review is the level of judicial scrutiny to be applied, the government action at issue is normally sustained. 12
Traditionally, the surest way for plaintiffs to defeat objectionable
state action was to qualify for heightened scrutiny. 1 " If a litigant could
establish that he or she was entitled to either intermediate scrutiny or
strict scrutiny, his or her chances of success increased. Thus, in Craig v.
Boren,1 4 the Court determined that discrimination based on gender is
subject to intermediate scrutiny.
This standard requires the government classification to be substantially related to an important state interest. 1 In Craig, the plaintiffs challenged an Oklahoma statute that proscribed the sale of "nonintoxicating" beer to men under the age of
twenty-one and women under the age of eighteen. 17 After an extensive
examination of the state's statistics, the Court held that the data did not
mandate a conclusion that gender represents an accurate approximation of
drinking habits. 1 " Specifically, the Justices found the relationship be117
119
119
t20

See id. at 487.

See id. at 490.
See id. at 488.
See Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487 ("[I]t is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement.").
121 See id. The Court stated numerous times that the legislature "might have concluded" the regulations were a rational way to deal with a societal problem. See id.
122 See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Eolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) (stating that rational basis review is "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact" (footnote omitted)).

See supra note 19.

124 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
125 See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 3 (characterizing the type of review employed in
Crlfa as "intermediate" or "middle level" review).
See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 ("[Cilassifications by gender must serve important

governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.").
127 See id. at 191-92.
128 See id. at 201.
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tween gender and traffic safety to have been overly
attenuated and not
12 9
interest.
state
important
an
to
related
substantially
Finally, strict judicial scrutiny requires the government classification
130
to be narrowly tailored toward achieving a compelling state objective.
In equal protection jurisprudence, strict scrutiny has been reserved for
classifications based on race, national origin, or religion, or for state action that burdens a fundamental right.131 Because most government classifications can be attacked as overinclusive and, thus, not narrowly tailored, strict scrutiny has traditionally been thought of as "'strict' in
theory and fatal in fact." 1 32 In sum, intermediate scrutiny and strict
scrutiny have been the best tools for litigants challenging government action under the Equal Protection Clause.

129 See id. at 202-03.
130 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2061 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(explaining that strict scrutiny is applied to decide whether the means chosen are narrowly
tailored toward achieving a compelling government interest).
131 See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 3. The right to vote and the right to have one's
vote count equally are fundamental rights that cannot be contingent on a citizen's race.
See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 24 (1968) (stating that Ohio election law that
"made it virtually impossible for a new political party" to choose electors for President
was a denial of equal protection); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670

(1966) (determining Virginia poll tax to be unconstitutional because it was an invidious
scheme to deny a segment of the citizenry the right to vote); Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89, 89, 96-97 (1965) (finding a Texas constitutional provision that denied the right
to vote to members of the armed services who temporarily resided in Texas during their

time in the armed services to be unconstitutional); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555
(1964) (holding that a citizen's right to vote is unconstitutionally diminished when his or
her vote's weight is diluted, compared with votes of residents of other parts of the state).
Additionally, government decision-making cannot take one's race into account. See
Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 462-63, 487 (1982) (announcing
that a state initiative allowing school boards to reassign students away from their local

school for any reason except racial integration was an unconstitutional violation of equal
protection); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 387, 393 (1969) (declaring unconstitutional an amendment to a city charter that required any ordinance prohibiting discrimination in housing to be approved first in a general election); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369, 370-71, 381 (1967) (finding that an article of the California Constitution violated
equal protection because it prohibited the state from denying any individual the choice to
discriminate in the sale of his or her real property). Any state action that classifies individuals along these racial lines is, therefore, subjected to strict scrutiny, and must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
132 Gunther, supra note 122, at 8. Recently, however, the Court has made it clear that
the application of strict scrutiny will not automatically result in a finding that the challenged action is unconstitutional. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097, 2117 (1995).
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B. HistoricalApplications of Active RationalBasis Review
Recently, an unusual level of constitutional scrutiny has emerged in
which the Court applies a brand of review that is greater than traditional
rational basis review but not as searching as intermediate scrutiny. Some
commentators have declared that this is simply intermediate scrutiny by a
different name, 133 but the Court has been adamant in stating that the level
of scrutiny applied is rational basis review.134 In any event, a new tier of
review has emerged. This is illustrated by the common analyses employed in United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,13 5 City of
aeburne v. Clebue Living Center, Inc., 136 and Romer v. Evans.137 In
each case, the Court purported to apply rational basis review but actually
engaged in a stringent analysis of whether the means chosen rationally
furthered the achievement of some desired end. 13 In each, the Court required greater rationality when it sensed that the legislative action at issue
was motivated by irrational prejudice, stereotyping, or animus toward the
affected group.
The question to be answered, then, is what will trigger active rational basis review.
In Moreno, plaintiffs challenged a 1971 amendment to the Food
Stamp Act that limited federal food stamp assistance to households consisting entirely of related family members.140 The named appellee was a
member of a household that satisfied the income eligibility requirements
but was denied assistance because the members of her household were
not "'all related to each other.'" 141 Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, expressly stated that the majority was employing rational basis
133 See generally Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate

Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987) (discussing rational basis with bite

as a standard of judicial review).

134 See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996) (upholding a legislative classi-

fication if it "bears a rational relation to some legitimate end"); C/eburne, 473 U.S. at

442 (stating that persons who are mentally retarded are not members of a quasi-suspect
class); United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973) (pointing out
that state action will be sustained when the classification drawn is "rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest").
135 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
136 473 U.S. 432 (1986).
137 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).

135 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627; Cleburne, 437 U.S. at 442; Moreno, 413 U.S. at
533.
139 Cf. Pettinga, supra note 133, at 802 (hypothesizing that rational basis with bite is
triggered by "legislation that burdens the important right of a group which at least approaches a quasi-suspect status").
140 See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529 (examining an amendment to the Food Stamp Act
and determining that people who live in a household containing one or more persons that

are not related to the rest will be denied federal food assistance).
141 Id. at531.
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review. 142 The Justice noted that the government argued the new restrictions were necessary to combat fraud. 43 There was evidence, however,
that a driving force behind the legislation was a desire to prevent
"hippies" from benefiting from the food stamp program. 1"
Subsequently, the Court closely analyzed the nexus between restricting food stamp benefits and combating fraud. 14 The majority noted that
while hippies would be able to alter their living arrangements and remain
eligible for food stamp benefits, mothers with dependent children would
be adversely affected by being forced to Five up their shared housing in
order to remain eligible for the program.
Thus, the Court concluded,
rather than combat fraud by tageting hippies, the legislation would have
had the exact opposite effect. 14 Secondly, Justice Brennan observed that
the Food Stamp Act had separate sections specifically addressing fraud
and abuse.148 This observation, the Court asserted, defeated the government's argument that the amended food stamp rules were necessary to
combat fraud. 149 The Justice viewed the classification of food stamp recipients based upon arbitrary household arrangements to have been
"clearly irrelevant" to achieving the stated congressional goals. 150 While
noting that even imprecise classifications will normally withstand rational
basis review, 51 the Court held the amendments to the Food Stamp Act to
have been entirely lacking a rational basis. 152 Thus, the majority held the
legislation invalid, stating that "a bare congressional desire to harm a

142 See id. at 533 (pointing out that state action will be sustained if the classification
drawn is "rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest").
143 See id. at 535 (observing that the government conceded that the classification might
have been targeted at hippies, yet maintained that it should be upheld because it might

rationally be related to minimizing fraud).

See id. at 534.
145 See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535-38.
146 See id. at 537-38 (reviewing the congressional testimony of a California social
144

worker).

147 See id. at 538. The Court stated that:
in practical operation, the 1971 amendment excludes from participation in

the food stamp program, not those persons who are "likely to abuse the
program" but, rather, only those persons who are so desperately in need of
aid that they cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to

retain their eligibility.
Id.

148 See id. at 536.
149 See id. at 537 ("ITIhe challenged classification simply does not operate so as ra-

tionally to further the prevention of fraud.").

ISO See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.

151 See id. at 538 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
152

See id.
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politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government interest."

3

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. concerned an equal
protection challenge to a local zoning scheme that required group homes
for the mentally retarded to obtain a special use permit that was not required for apartment buildings, boarding houses, dormitories, hotels,
The Court claimed that it was applying
hospitals, or nursing homes.
rational basis scrutiny.155 Additionally, Justice White, writing for the
majority, found that the court of appeals had erred in characterizing the
mentally retarded as a quasi-suspect class. 156 In doing so, the Court set
forth numerous reasons why the mentally retarded were not entitled to
heightened scrutiny. 5 7
Next, the majority asserted that one of the prime motivations behind
the discrimination was the negative attitudes of neighborhood residents.1 5 8 The Court subsequently engaged in a detailed analysis of
whether the justifications for a special use permit were rationally related
to the achievement of a legitimate zoning objective. 5 9
The majority found the city's action to have been highly underinclusive. 160 In light of the fact that thirty mentally retarded students attended a junior high school across the street from the site of the proposed
facility, the Court reasoned, it was illogical for the city to base its permit
denial on potential negative student reaction to the group home. 6 1 In
addition, the majority exposed the inconsistency in the city's concern for
the dangers of a group home for the mentally retarded while disregarding

153 Id. at 534.

154 See 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985).
155 See id. at 446 ("To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes
between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.").
156 See id. at 442.
157

See id. at 442-46.

The Court noted that, generally, legislators have responded to

the needs of the mentally retarded in various ways; thus, they are not politically powerless. See id.
158 See id. at 448 (stating that the city failed to provide a rational basis for the requirement of a special use permit).
159 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448-50 (exposing the various inconsistencies between
the standards used in evaluating group homes for the mentally retarded and the standards

by which all other institutions were judged).
16D See id. The court of appeals found "It]he same house with the same number of
occupants would be a permitted use so long as the occupants were not mentally retarded." See Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 200 (5th Cir.
1984), affld in part vacated in part sub nont City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,

Inc 473 U.S. 432 (1985).

16t See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449.
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162
similar dangers posed by hospitals, dormitories, or nursing homes.
The Court uncovered comparable inconsistencies in the city's alleged

concern for reducing congestion, fire hazards, and noise. 163 Essentially,
the Court found none of the city's means to have been rationally related
to achieving legitimate ends.164
Furthermore, Justice White declared that prejudice and fear are not

proper bases for disparate treatment of the mentally retarded.165 As a
matter of policy, the Court stated that "' [p ] rivate biases may be outside
the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them
effect.'" 166 In summary, the majority announced that "requiring the
permit in this case appears...
to rest on an irrational prejudice against
167
the mentally retarded."
Both of these cases failed what the Court purported was rational basis review. The same disjunction between the Court's stated level of review and its actual degree of scrutiny occurred in Romer. While the
Romer analysis could conceivably be characterized as intermediate scrutiny, the Court stated specifically that it was applying rational basis review. 1
Justice Kennedy first examined in detail the drastic effects of
Amendment Two,169 none of which were remotely related to the
achievement of Colorado's desired ends. 170 The Court specifically mentioned that this type of enactment was unprecedented 17 1 and that the
amendment did not rationally further the state's asserted goals, 172 which
supporters claimed were safeguarding the family, protecting children
from molestation, and protecting civil rights for "authentic minori-

162 See id.The Court rejected the town's concerns regarding the home's location on a
five hundred year flood plain, the lack of legal responsibility of the mentally retarded, and
the number of people that would occupy the group home. See id.
163

See id. at 450.

164 See id. (finding that the reasons for the disparate treatment "fail rationally to justify
singling out a home such as 201 Featherston for the special use permit, yet imposing no
such restrictions on the many other uses freely permitted in the neighborhood").
165 See id. (determining that the discriminatory treatment was caused by irrational
preudice toward the mentally retarded).
I
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433
(1984)).
167 Id.at 450.
168 See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996) (stating that the Court will uphold a legislative classification if it "bears a rational relation to some legitimate end").
169 See id.at 1625-27.
170 See id.at 1629 ("[Amendment Two] is a status-based enactment divorced from any
factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; it

is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection
Clause does not permit.").
171 See id.at 1628.
172 See id. at 1629.
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ties."173 In light of these two observations, the Court concluded that
Amendment Two was conceived for no purpose other than creating a
specific subclass of citizens. 174 The Court was forced to presume that
Amendment Two was motivated by nothing more than animus toward
lesbians and gay men. 175
Under traditional rational basis review, the challenged state action in
Moreno and aleburne would surely have passed constitutional scrutiny.
In that framework, the Moreno Court would not have scrutinized the
government's alleged desire to eliminate food stamp fraud. Even though
the Food Stamp Act had a separate section that specifically dealt with
fraud, the Court would not have questioned the need for, wisdom of, or
inconsistencies in the legislation. The Court would have deferred instead
to the legislature's government expertise. In Cleburne, traditional rational basis review would
have abdicated to the legislature's right to take
"one step at a time." 1 76 Even if it could be shown that other institutions
would pose the very same risks as a group home for the mentally retarded, traditional rational basis review would not trump the legislative
decision to address group homes first and to ignore problems posed by
hospitals, nursing homes, or dormitories. If Amendment Two had been
analyzed using traditional rational basis review, the Romer Court would
not have upset the Colorado electorate's decision that lesbians and gay
men should not benefit from any allegedly special rights.
In essence, irrational prejudice appears to be the triggering mechanism for active rational basis review. When the Court uncovers evidence
tending to show that bare prejudice was the motivation behind discriminatory state action, the Justices will inquire as to whether the government
action actually functions to achieve its stated goals. 177 Additionally, if
discrimination against a distinct minority cannot be justified by any logic
whatsoever, the Court may find that the government was motivated by
"animus toward the class that [the state action] affects."' 7 The Court
173 See Grauerholz, supra note 17, at 848.

174 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
175 See id. at 1628 ("[Ljaws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference
that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.-).
176 Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) ("[R]eform may take
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute
to the legislative mind" (citation omitted)).

177 C. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 ("[Amendment Twol identifies persons by a single

trait and then denies them protection across the board."); United States Dep't of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (declaring that, because the legislative history evidenced a desire to discriminate against hippies, the Court could not give credence to the

official congressional justification for the law).
178 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.

1997]

COMMENT

1087

should, however, clarify that the active rational basis review of Romer is
very different from the traditional rational basis review employed in a
case such as Lee Optical. Finally, the Court should explain in its own
words when and why active rational basis review will be triggered. The
constitutional inquiries employed in Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer provide ample precedent on which the Court can rely in future equal protection challenges to irrational government classifications.
IlI. THE MAJORITY, THE DISSENT-MISSED OPPORTUNITIES, BLATANT
HOMOPHOBIA

As discussed in Part II, the Romer Court applied a level of constitutional scrutiny other than traditional rational basis review. Because ac-

tive rational basis review entails a precise dissection of the state's means
and ends, the Court should have taken the opportunity to state exactly
why Amendment Two was irrational. Instead, the Court declared in a
conclusory fashion that Amendment Two was not rationally related to
furthering a legitimate state objective.179 By parsing the assumptions relied upon by the supporters of the amendment, the Court could have
shown Amendment Two to have been a manifestation of irrational prejudice based upon archaic notions of same-sex sexual orientation."18
In addition, the Court failed to rely substantially on Ceburne or
Moreno. These cases failed what the Court said was rational basis review. In Cleburne and Moreno the government was precluded from
subjecting a discrete segment of society to irrational government action.
By looking to these cases and engaging in a similar type of analysis, the
majority would have weakened Justice Scalia's assertion
that the Romer
181
decision had no precedential basis in constitutional law.
Finally, the majority failed to answer any of the criticisms contained
in the dissenting opinion. Specifically, the Court should have stated why
Bowers v. Hardwick was not dispositive 18 2 If it had employed active rational basis review, the majority opinion would have been instructive to
17

See id.; see aLso id. at 1636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court failed to

show why Amendment Two was an impermissible targeting of lesbians and gay men).
18D See Culverhouse & Lewis, supra note 16, at 243 (describing the myths that lesbians and gay men are mentally ill and more likely to engage in child abuse and molestation); Goldberg, supra note 2, at 1077-78 (describing the testimony of a defense witness
who, at the trial of Amendment Two, drew "analogies . .. between gays, pedophiles and
necrophiliacs").
151 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "[tloday's opinion has no foundation in American constitutional law, and barely pretends to"). For a
discussion of where the Romer Court could have looked for precedent, see supra notes
107-78 and accompanying text.
182 See infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
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the lower courts, some of which were the source of Justice Scalia's substantive due3 process reasoning in evaluating Romer's equal protection
challenge. 1
Professor Sunstein's essay regarding the interplay between gay
rights, substantive due process, and equal protection could have been one
source of guidance to the Court.18 4 Professor Sunstein asserted that the
Due Process Clause looks to history and tradition in deciding whether a
practice should be protected from government intrusion.1 85 This clause
protects a right if it "is a 'fundamental principle of liberty and justice
which inheres in the very idea of free government'" 18 6 or "'is necessary ... [in a] regime of ordered liberty.'"

7

The Equal Protection

Clause, on the other hand, takes no account of what has been a traditional
practice and looks instead, to ensure equal treatment for all similarly
situated citizens.181 This clause acts as a check on deeply entrenched,
long standing practices. 8 9 As such, the two clauses protect two different
sets of principles.190 Taken together, the Equal Protection Clause could
conceivably protect minorities against selective enforcement of valid laws
that regulate conduct not protected by the Due Process Clause.191 Applying this analysis to the facts of Romer, one can see how it is permissible
for the majority to ignore Bowers.
Justice Scalia's dissent is also flawed. As one commentator has
noted: "If the majority opinion is bad, the Scalia dissent... is ulti183 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

The Justice relied upon

Equality Foundation, Inc. v. ty of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated,
116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994); and Padula v.
Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Padula asserted that participation in same-sex
practices is the defining characteristic of lesbians and gay men, see 822 F.2d at 103,
while Equality Foundation, 54 F.3d at 267, and Steffan, 41 F.3d at 690, concluded that
there isno distinction between, on the one hand, participants in same-sex acts and, on the
other, persons of same-sex orientation.
14 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation
and the Constitution: A Note
on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. C.
L. REv.
1161 (1988).
185 See id.at 1168.
186 Id. at 1171 (quoting Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908)).
97 Id. (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968)); see also
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1994) (determining that the Court is reluctant
to expand the protections of substantive due process beyond those fundamental rights relatinJ to marriage, family, procreation, or bodily integrity).
See Sunstein, supra note 184, at 1174.
is, See id.
190 See id.
191 See Watkins v. United States Army,875 F.2d 699, 718 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring) (positing that equal protection inquiries are entirely distinct from those of due
process); see aLo infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
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mately worse." 192 First of all, Justice Scalia portrayed Amendment Two
as a quintessential act of pure democracy. 193 The Justice, however, conveniently ignored the fact that Amendment Two was not mere legislation.
Instead, the amendment precluded any further meaningful debate in Colorado regarding gay rights. 194 Under Amendment Two, hypothetically, a
Colorado citizen could petition his or her state legislators for legislation
supporting lesbian or gay interests, but it would be to no avail. Any
such legislative enactment would have been invalid under Amendment
Two. By quelching an ongoing cultural debate, Amendment Two was
the antithesis of democracy. Amendment Two did not allow Coloradans
to enter a cultural discussion concerning lesbians and gay men; rather,
Amendment Two altogether ended the debate.
Moreover, Justice Scalia did not even begin to show how curtailing
civil rights protections for lesbians and gay men was rationally related to
achieving the goals of Amendment Two. Justice Scalia grounded his
analysis in due process considerations and attempted to use Bowers v.
Hardwick to show why Amendment Two was rational.195 The dissenting
Justice examined the criteria usually employed in measuring whether a
right is fundamental for the purposes of substantive due process and then
considered those criteria in deciding whether Amendment Two was ra-

192

29.

193

Stuart Taylor, Twisting and Turning on Gay Rights, N.J. LJ., May 27, 1996, at
See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1634 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)

(" [Hlomosexuals are as entitled to use the legal system for reinforcement of their moral

sentiments as are the rest of society. But they are subject to being countered by lawful,
democratic countermeasures as well."); see also supra notes 94-96 and accompanying
text.
194 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 56, at 45. "[With Amendment
Two,]
it's everything-lesbians and gay men shall] not have access to the ordinary legislative
process for anything that will improve [their] condition ....
[Gays] will not be able to
appeal to [their] State legislature to improve [their] status. [They] will need a constitutional change to do that." Id. at 8. In the case of Amendment Two, "the ban extends to
State legislation as well as to local legislation here. It's not a question of who can do it,
but the State itself can't do it through the ordinary legislative process. It will take a constitutional change." Id. at 14. "The constitutional bar... to ever adopting a protection
of any sort... is a very different type of barrier than a simple repealer and reenactment,
because it means that if [gays are] going to ever obtain any protection, [they have] to
amend the State constitution first." Id. at 56. The Court did not endorse the argument

that Amendment Two impinged on a fundamental right to participate in the political process.

See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624 (explaining that the Court would affirm the lower

court judgment, but "on a rationale different from that adopted by the State Supreme
Court"). For a more extensive discussion of the argument that Amendment Two impinged on a fundamental right to participate in the political process, see Niblock, supra

note 60, at 174.

See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming there is no question
that Amendment Two had a rational basis).
195
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tional."" First, Justice Scalia claimed that persons of same-sex orienta197
tion are coterminous with persons who engage in same-sex sodomy.
Next, the Justice highlighted that under Bowers, criminalization of same-

sex sodomy is not unconstitutional. 198 Finally, Justice Scalia reasoned

that if it is constitutionally permissible to proscribe same-sex sodomy, it
surely must be rational to take milder steps that stop short of criminal
sanctions. 199
There is a fundamental problem with this reasoning process. Bowers involved a substantive due process analysis and is thus inapposite to
an equal protection case such as Romer.2
The fact that same-sex sodomy is not a time-honored tradition does not translate into a carte blanche
invitation to discriminate against lesbians and gay men. 2 0 1 Moreover, the
dissent failed to recognize that it is inappropriate to define a group of
people by their sexual practices. m Heterosexuals are not defined along
such narrow lines. 2 W Likewise, the lives of lesbians and gay men cannot
be solely defined as a search for sexual gratification. Next, there is substantial research that can disprove the myth that lesbians and gay men
choose their sexual orientation. 2°4 Thus, Bowers is itself questionable in
See
See
198 See
199 See

id.
id. (quoting Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
id. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986)).
id. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1631-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2W Cf. Sunstein, supra note 184, at 1175-76 (noting that the Equal Protection
Clause
can offer protection to lesbians and gay men, even if same-sex sodomy is not a time honored practice, traditionally protected from the interference of government); see also Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 716 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring)
(illustrating that the Bowers Court did not decide, indeed, the parties did not address,
whether the sodomy statute at issue might run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause).
2M See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 723 (Norris, J., concurring) (explaining that
Bowers held
only that there is no fundamental right to same-sex sodomy). Judge Norris further explained:
I see no principled way to transmogrify the [Bowers] Court's holding that
the due process clause permits states to criminalize specific sexual conduct
commonly engaged in by homosexuals into a holding that the equal protection clause gives states a license to pass 'homosexual laws'-4aws imposing
special restrictions on gays because they are gay.
Id.
2o See Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling,
Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protectionfor Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 511, 546 (1992).
196

197

2W See id.
24 See Fernando J. Gutierrez, Gay and Lesbian" An Ethnic Identity Deserving
Equal

Protection, 4 LAw & SEx. 195, 219-20 (1994) (setting forth the findings of Sociologist
John Harry, who has determined: (1) sexual orientation is resistant to change and is realized during early adolescence and (2) whether or not a person chooses to engage in a
particular type of sexual activity has nothing to do with his or her orientation, which remains the same throughout the person's life).
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light of new medical findings. As such, any action that treats lesbians
and gay men based solely upon a genetic trait that has no relevance 2to
05
their ability to contribute to society is constitutionally repugnant.
Therefore, Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer failed to show logically how
Bowers had any effect on the constitutionality of Amendment Two.
Finally, Justice Scalia asked, "[h]as the Court concluded that the
perceived social harm of polygamy is a 'legitimate concern of -overnJusment,' and the perceived social harm of homosexuality is not?"
enfor
Court
the
chastised
and
was
yes
answer
the
that
opined
Scalia
tice
°7
entire
opinion,
Scalia's
Justice
dorsing one side in the "cultural war."2
however, can be read as a wholehearted endorsement of Amendment Two
and its supporters, rather than a plea to the Court to abstain from a controversial moral debate. 208 In the same vein, the dissenting Justice chided
the Court for bowing to the political forces opposing Amendment Two
but ignored that the political forces supporting the amendment were also
fairly well organized. 2° 9 Considering that between two and ten percent of
the Justice turns the opinion on its
Americans are lesbians or gay men,
to favor "the knights rather
tends
the
Court
that
head when he claims
2 11
than the villeins."

W5 See Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. Prrr. L. REV. 237, 275 (1996) (proposing that, at bottom, the real question is
whether sexual orientation is relevant to an individual's ability to contribute to society);
cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (observing that a "sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society"); Niblock,
supra note 60, at 169 (opining that the denial of civil rights for lesbians and gay men is

arbitrary).

M6 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207 See id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "[wihen the Court takes sides in
the culture wars, it tends to be with the knights rather than the villeins-and more specifically with the Templars"). A villein is "a free common villager or village peasant of any
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERof the feudal classes lower in rank than the thane."
NATIONAL DICIONARY 2552 (1993). A templar is "a barrister or student of law having
chambers in the Temple, London." Id. at 2353.
Z8 See Chai Feldblum, Based on a Moral Vision, NJ. L.J., Aug. 26, 1996, at S-6.
209 See Pamela Coukos, Recent Development, Civil Rights and Special Wrongs-The
Amendment 2 Litigation, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 581, 583-84 (1994) (describing
the monetary and organizational support received by CFV from other right-wing, conser-

vative organizations).

210 See S. Claire Swift, Note, BystanderLiability After Dunphy v. Gregor: A Proposal
for a New Definition of the Bystander, 15 REV. LrIO. 579, 593 (1996); see also Paul
Cotton, How Vefbitive' is New Sex Survey? Answers Vary, 272 JAMA 1727, 1729
(1994) (noting that while a fairly small percentage of survey respondents identified themselves as lesbian or gay, those numbers may be depressed because of many factors).
211 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION

We are not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative,
pluralistic one, in which we must be willing to abide someone else's
unfamiliar or even repellent practice because the same tolerant impulse protects our own idiosyncrasies ....
In a community
such as
2 12

ours, "liberty" must include the freedom not to conform.
Romer has cemented a change in the equal protection landscape but
the Court, however, must explain the exact contour and reach of the de-

cision. The Romer Court came to the proper decision and applied active
rational basis review. To quiet critics of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence, the majority should have officially declared the adoption of
active rational basis review. 213 In using active rational basis review, the

Court could have dispelled some societal and judicial stereotypes exemplified by Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion. Despite inconsistent application, active rational basis review will most immediately benefit lesbian
and gay Americans. It is not difficult to imagine applying active rational
basis review
to a criminal sodomy statute 1 or to the Defense of Mar2 15
riage Act.

Discrimination against lesbians and gay men is revolting, 216 particu-

larly in light of the hypocrisy2 17 of the supporters of Amendment Two.
212
213
214

Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 107-10.
See Sunstein, supra note 184, at 1170 (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause

would prohibit the government from proscribing same-sex sodomy while permitting heterosexual sodomy); cf. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 458 n.12 (7th Cir. 1996)
(predicting that, since the advent of Romer, Bowers v. Hardwick will one day no longer
be good law).
21s See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).

The
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) amended title 28 of the United States Code to allow
states the option not to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states. See id. §
2 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. 1997)). DOMA also restricts the federal definition of marriage to a union between one woman and one man. See id. § 3 (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. 1997)).
216 See Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 451-52. The facts of this case are especially sickening.
Jamie Nabozny was a gay teenager from Wisconsin who sued local school officials for,
inter alia, violating "his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection by discriminating against him based on his sexual orientation .... " Id. at 449. He endured four years
of abuse at the hands of fellow students. See id. at 451. Nabozny and his parents unsuccessfilly pleaded for school adinistrators to intervene and protect Nabozny from the
abuse. See id. at 451, 452. No one intervened even though the abuse included a mock
rape in front of twenty other laughing students and a ten-minute beating at the hands of
another pupil, from which Nabozny collapsed due to internal bleeding. See id. As a result of all this, Nabozny attempted suicide numerous times. See id. at 452. Finally, after
four years of unchecked abuse, Nabozny withdrew from school. See id. The trial court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and Nabozny appealed. See id. at
449. The court of appeals held that Nabozny had in fact offered adequate evidence of
discriminatory treatment, which was motivated by school officials' disapproval of the stu-
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Romer v. Evans is just one of several historic gay rights victories
achieved in 199 6 .2 18 Hopefully, these notable successes will foster positive societal discourse once lesbian, gay, and homophobic Americans approach their differences with open minds.2 19 In an attempt to mock the
majority, Justice Scalia observed that Romer puts the prestige of the Supreme Court behind the notion that "opposition to homosexuality is as
reprehensible as racial or religious bias." 22° Ironically, Justice Scalia hit
the nail on the head.
Kevin G. Walsh

dent's sexual orientation. See id. at 457, 460. Subsequently, a federal jury found that
school officials were liable for not protecting Nabozny from his abusive fellow students.
See Stephanie Francis Cahill, Watch Out, Schoolyard Bullies, STUDNr LAW., Mar. 1997,
at4.
217 Compare Grauerholz, supra note 17, at 848 (describing one of the purposes
of
Amendment Two as an attempt to prevent 'dissolution of civil rights protection for
'authentic minorities'") with Suzanne B. Goldberg, Facing the Challenge: A Lawyer's
Response to Anti-Gay Initiatives, 55 OHIO ST. LJ. 665, 671 (1994) (implying that
Amendment Two was a precursor to rejecting civil rights protections for any and all mi-

nority groups).
Goldberg observes that it is not long before the "special rights" argument employed
in the gay rights context is extended to include "no special rights" for women or AfricanAmericans. See id. If one accepts the ideology of Amendment Two's supporters, "the
path has been forged for a quick rejection of 'special rights' for any group-gay, lesbian,
or otherwise." Id.
215 See Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 68 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
44,211, at 86,351-53 (Or. Cir. Ct. Aug. 13, 1996) (enjoining the State of Oregon from
denying health insurance coverage to domestic partners of lesbians and gay men even
though such benefits are available to the spouses of heterosexual employees); David W.
Dunlap, Gay Partnersof LB.M. Workers to Get Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1996, at
A18. I.B.M. is the largest American employer to provide health-care coverage to samesex couples. See id. In 1991, Lotus, a computer software company, extended benefits to
same-sex couples--the first publicly traded corporation to do so. See id. Of the 313
American employers that provide such benefits, notable ones include Apple, Eastman
Kodak, Hewlett-Packard, Microsoft, Sun Microsystems, Time Warner, Walt Disney, and
Xerox. See id.
219 See Alan Brown, Culture Wars or Social Responsibility, (visited Mar. 23,
1997)
<http://abacus.oxy.edu/pub/queerlaw/digests/vOl.n234>
(recounting lessons learned
and progress made when right wing Christian groups participated in a series of meetings
with Oregon's lesbian and gay leaders). Promise Keepers is a national group of Christian
men founded by a prominent supporter of Amendment Two. See id. After the group announced it was holding a meeting for 40,000 men in Oregon, Gayle Landt of the Conflict
Resolution Center proposed a series of discussion sessions between Promise Keepers and
regional lesbian and gay activists. See id. According to Brown, a participant in the dialogue, these discussion sessions were productive because participants shared, listened,
and learned. See id. After these discussion sessions were over, many participants had
built meaningful, continuing friendships. See id.
20 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

